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Introduction
Manufacturing in many developed countries has been in continued and steady decline, both in terms of share of GDP and employment, over the last four decades. 1 However, the decline in both measures has been particularly steep in the UK (Moffat, 2013 ; Government Office for Science, 2013) . Nevertheless, manufacturing still makes a disproportionate contribution to the UK economy: a recent report on manufacturing in the UK (Government Office for Science, 2013) notes its relatively high productivity, its accounting for half of UK exports in 2010 (despite only contributing 10% to gross value added), its greater propensity to undertake R&D and introduce innovations, the strength of its inter-industry linkages and its use of highlyskilled labour. The importance of manufacturing is not new (see Kaldor, 1966; Harris, 1987) , but recognition of it now underpins a commitment by the UK Government to halting its longrun decline (BIS 2010 (BIS , 2012b . 2 The aim of this paper is to consider whether the productivity performance of manufacturing has played a role in its long-run (relative) decline. Since productivity (and especially the productivity of both labour and capital inputs into the production process, i.e. total factor productivity, or TFP) is widely recognised as the key driver of long-run economic growth (e.g., 3 Krugman, 1997; Baumol, 1984; O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009; Van Reenen, 2013) , it is important to understand the progress of TFP in all sectors of the economy. But since part of the decline in manufacturing has historically been linked to its poor productivity performance (e.g., O'Mahony, 1998; O'Mahony and de Boer, 2002) , such an understanding is of particular relevance here. Therefore, in this paper, we use plant-level data from the Annual Business Survey (ABS), conducted by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), to provide a detailed review of the productivity performance of British manufacturing from 1973 to 2012.
The next section describes the relative decline in manufacturing compared to other major economies and presents TFP estimates calculated using growth accounting methods applied to industry-level data. Section 3 discusses our preferred approach for estimating TFP for each manufacturing plant in the ABS. In Section 4, these estimates are used to decompose productivity growth to show whether productivity growth/decline over 1973-2012 was the result of within-plant increases in productivity or reallocations of output shares across plants.
Section 5 attempts to explain some of the trends in TFP in 1994-2012 by showing which groups of plants have contributed most to productivity growth. Groups are defined by ownership, levels of industry outsourcing, 'openness' to trade, labour force composition, and intangible assets. The paper concludes with a summary and brief discussion of policy options.
Figures 1 and 2 around here

Manufacturing performance
De-industrialisation in the UK (i.e., the decline of manufacturing's share of total economy GDP) has occurred faster than in other major economies; Figure 1 shows that, in 1970, the sector 4 accounted for the second largest share of GDP among the countries considered, but by 2014 it had experienced the largest relative decline (a 20 percentage points fall). However, Figure 2 suggests that this was not due to poor TFP performance (based on the growth accounting approach) since TFP in UK manufacturing saw a steady rise over the 1973-2007 period (with a major setback following the Great Recession). Moreover, its performance was comparable to that in France and Germany and much better than Italy's, although not as strong as in the USA.
By contrast, British TFP growth in non-manufacturing was at best lack-lustre. 3 The above TFP results based on the growth accounting approach are useful but limited since there are problems both with the methods used to construct TFP and the use of industry-level data (cf. Caves, 1998; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) . Some of the methodological issues with the standard growth accounting approach are: the typical use of gross value-added rather than gross output measures of production (see Gandhi et al., 2012 , for a discussion of the limitations of the GVA approach); 4 the imposition of constant returns-to-scale; the assumption of perfect competition in factor and output markets (necessary since output elasticities are 3 The peak level of non-manufacturing TFP was only slightly higher in 2007 when compared to 1973, whereas in manufacturing it was 55 percentage points higher. Put another way, average TFP growth p.a. in nonmanufacturing 1973-2007 was less than 0.1% compared to 2.3% in manufacturing. 4 See also Sudit and Finger (1981, p. 15 ) who discuss gross output versus value-added measures of the production function, referring particularly to the work of Diewert (1978) and Bruno (1978) , both of whom were early proponents of a gross output approach. Diewert (op. cit., p.42 ) went as far as saying: "one is … led to wonder about how much of the "unexplained residual" in growth studies … is due to the unjustified use of a real valueadded framework". 5 equated to factor input cost shares in total revenue); and the treatment of TFP as an unexplained residual. 5 The use of aggregate data is problematic as, for example, micro-level empirical evidence consistently indicates that plants/firms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity and industry-level data typically over-estimate measures of the capital stock, since the capital of plants that cease production usually remains in the industry-level measure of the stock. 6 Moreover, the use of aggregate data precludes an analysis of whether reallocations of output shares explain the evolution of aggregate TFP. It is therefore not possible to state whether the above trends are the result of the closure of low TFP plants (i.e. a selection effect), within-plant increases in TFP or a more efficient allocation of output shares among surviving plants. Such an analysis is provided in the next section.
5 That is, factors that shift plants towards the 'best-practice' current technological frontier, together with those that influence technological progress, are not explicitly included or modelled in the growth accounting approach. This leads to bias in the output-elasticities relating factor inputs to output, given there are 'omitted variables' in the growth-accounting equation. 
Plant-level estimates of TFP
In this study, we use plant-level panel data for manufacturing covering 1973-2012. The basic approach is described in the earlier analysis of Harris and Moffat (2015a) , that estimates TFP for each market-sector plant operating in Great Britain in 1997-2008, although certain variables, such as R&D spending and whether a UK-owned plant belonged to a multinational enterprise, are only available since 1997 and are therefore omitted here. Harris and Moffat (op. cit.) describe in detail the rationale for inclusion of the variables in the model, the data (and especially the use of plants-rather than firms as the unit of analysis) and the econometric methodology, and the reader is referred to the earlier article for detailed information. Below, only the core elements of the approach used are set out. 7 TFP is estimated by plant (i.e., local unit) for each year covering 1973-2012 for manufacturing sectors as defined using the 1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The first step was estimation of Cobb-Douglas log-linear production functions for each 2-digit industry (with certain industries sub-divided into 3-digit groupings -see the online appendix for details) using a system-GMM approach to address the issues of endogeneity inherent to production function estimation: 8 7 Further details about the variables included and the data are provided in an online appendix 8 Estimators (such as Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) that purport to overcome these endogeneity issues are based on assumptions we believe are more restrictive than those implied by system-GMM (Ackerberg et al., 2015) . In particular, these estimators do not allow for fixed effects, which are important as empirical evidence shows that the distribution of productivity has both a large variance and is persistent over time (see, for instance, Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998; Martin, 2008 (2) ̂= −̂−̂−̂=̂+̂+̂+̂ However, Equation (2) is not a proper TFP index, because the measure of input growth (̂+̂+̂) does not satisfy axiom X5 (proportionality) in O'Donnell (2016), except in the case of constant returns-to-scale (as discussed below, we generally find nonsystem-GMM is used to overcome the bias that would arise from OLS estimation if firms make decisions on factor inputs based on the value of the TFP shock (error term), which is unobservable to the researcher. 9 Intermediate inputs cover materials, fuels, semi-and finished-goods and (especially business) services used in the production of new goods and services. We are not estimating a gross valued-added function because we do not want to impose weak separability (capital and labour are separable from intermediate inputs in production) and thus homogeneity with respect to -see Gandhi et al. (2012) for a discussion.
10 TFP here comprises those factors contained in X that influence efficiency and technological progress. It also comprises an error term (̂), which will pick up any measurement error, unobserved inputs (e.g., intangibles not captured by the R&D variable, the use of outsourcing, increased quality of labour inputs, etc.), and changes in the level of utilisation of factor inputs.
8 constant returns-to-scale prevailed when equation 1 is estimated). Proportionality is therefore restored by using a special case of the Färe-Primont (1995) input index:
The data used to estimate equation (1), as described in Oulton, 1997; Harris, 2002; and Griffith, 1999) . Estimates of plant level capital stock are obtained using the perpetual inventory approach and plant level estimates of real investment; the methods used are set out in Harris and Drinkwater (2000) and Harris (2005a) . Due to the stratified sampling frame of the ABS being biased towards larger plants, all data are weighted to be representative of the population of plants. Table 7 in Harris and Moffat (2015a) shows that this result is consistent with most recent studies.
12 Output (y, including lagged output in the dynamic model), factor inputs (e, m and k) and brownfield foreign- with recent evidence from micro-data that the UK's poor aggregate TFP performance since the Great Recession was entirely a service sector phenomenon (Harris and Moffat, 2016; Field and Franklin, 2013) . 14 However, the correlation between both series is 0.96 indicating that both follow similar time-paths. This again suggests that TFP performance did not play a major role in the relative decline of UK manufacturing. 
Productivity growth decompositions
Having obtained an index of TFP at the plant-level, this section considers the sources of productivity growth over the three sub-periods identified in Figure 3 . Then in Section V we focus on 1994-2012, and consider the contribution of different sub-groups of plants in an attempt to explain the rapid productivity growth in this period. Individual plant-level TFP is aggregated as follows:
is the share of (real) gross output for plant in at time . The growth of aggregate TFP is therefore given by: Following Foster et al. (2001) , TFP can be decomposed into five components as follows:
The first component shows the contribution from improvements in TFP within plants that As discussed by Melitz and Polanec (2015) , a weakness of this approach is that the contribution of entrants will be overstated (and the contribution of survivors understated) if there is productivity growth between − and among survivors because the contribution of entrants is calculated relative to that of all plants at − . A plant that opens at (or any time after − ), that has lower productivity than surviving plants at time , need only have higher productivity than the weighted average of productivity at time − in order to contribute positively to the entrants' term.
They therefore suggest an alternative decomposition method, based on the static decomposition of Olley and Pakes (1996) , that does not have this feature: Tables 2 and 3 around here   13   Tables 2 and 3 1973-1982 and 1982-1994 , TFP growth was lowered by the negative contribution of the closure or more productive plants. In 1994-2012, regardless of the decomposition method used, exiting plants made a positive but small contribution to productivity growth. The finding that TFP in manufacturing has increased over the last forty years is therefore not primarily due to the closure of low productivity plants.
Sources of productivity growth post-1994
Studies that have analysed the evolution of UK manufacturing productivity until the end of the 1980s (for example, Cameron, 2003) tended to concentrate on the structural changes that were taking place during this period. According to Cameron (2003, p. 122) , "In the 1970s … institutional rigidities, strong trade unions, lax competition policies, corporatist government interventions and a slowdown in technological advance led to a growth slowdown.…Growth rose in the 1980s because of the weakening of trade union power, withdrawal of state subsidies, the shedding of below average labour and capital, increasing subcontracting, the widespread adoption of 'microchip' technologies." 16 17 16 Cameron himself explained the higher productivity growth of the 1980s as being due to large and significant returns to business R&D, to decreasing unionisation, and to an increase in white-collar employment vis-a-vis manual employment. 17 While it is generally accepted that unions in the 1970s were a drag on productivity (Metcalf, 2003) , leading to productivity gains in the 1980s (Cameron, 2003; Bryson et al., 2005) , Van Reenen (2013) argues that it "seems improbable that antiunion laws would have a permanent effect on productivity growth. Unions would have to of have a seriously negative effect on innovation and there is no compelling evidence of this" (page 127). Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) conclude "that if all the available evidence is pooled together, measures of central tendency indicate a near zero association between unions and productivity … (although) a negative association appears for the United Kingdom and Japan" (page 682). Figure 4 below shows that in manufacturing most of the decline in unionisation had occurred by 1990, such that unionism per se had a negligible impact on productivity by the late 1990s (Pencavel, 2003; Bryson and Forth, 2010; Wright and Brown, 2014) . Further falls after this period were against a backdrop of much lower unionisation, with trade union density below 19% in 2012.
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In order to explain high productivity growth in 1994-2012, we consider the role of globalisation, the composition of the workforce and intangible assets. In relation to the former, the continued opening up of the UK economy is likely to have played a role in raising manufacturing TFP in 1994-2012. As Griffith et al. (2005) note: "deregulation and the opening of markets to international trade and investment has been widely recognised as a major driver of growth… (The) main effects of liberalisation … (are) the replacement of low productivity plants with high productivity entrants… increased competition or entry (inducing) incumbent firms to organise work more effectively, (while) the contribution of… multinationals to domestic productivity growth (advances) the U.K.'s technological frontier" (Griffith, op cit, pages 2-3). We consider three dimensions of globalisation: trade, foreign direct investment and offshoring. There is evidence for the UK that foreign-owned firms have higher productivity (Girma et al., 2001; Harris and Robinson, 2003; Harris and Moffat, 2015a) . Similarly, many studies have found that involvement in trade increases productivity (see Wagner, 2012 , for a review of the recent evidence and Harris and Moffat, 2015b for a recent study on the UK).
Alongside the opening of markets has been increased material and service outsourcing, and especially offshoring, in manufacturing worldwide, which a number of studies have found increases productivity (e.g. Amiti and Wei, 2009 ). The latter can arise for a number of reasons:
static efficiency gains as firms focus on core competencies and offshore less productive activities; interaction with foreign suppliers, which can enhance learning externalities; the higher quality or better fit of imported input varieties; and general equilibrium effects if productivity gains spill over to other firms or induce tougher competition (cf. Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005; Schwörer, 2013; Fariñas et al., 2011) .
A second major source of productivity gains since 1994 is likely to have been an up-skilling of the workforce employed in manufacturing. Raising the quality of labour input has a direct effect on productivity, which has been demonstrated in a large number of studies (e.g. Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003; Bosworth et al., 2008; Oesch and Menés, 2011; Madsen, 2013) . If higher human capital causes innovation, this will strengthen the impact of human capital on TFP (e.g. Gennaioli et al., 2013) . In recent decades the evidence for affluent countries is that high skill occupations have been expanding at the expense of low skilled ones, and this is especially true in Britain (Felstead et al., 2007) . This can be explained by growth in manufacturing imports from newly industrialising economies, skill-biased technical change associated with a growth in ICT and the demise of collective-bargaining for unskilled workers (Peng and Kang, 2013) . 18 Empirical evidence from Gregory et al. (2001) shows that over the period 1979-90 in the UK, technological change had a major influence on the relative demand for skills, while the effect of trade was relatively small.
Lastly, intangible assets (which can be defined as complimentary knowledge embodied in intellectual assets and thus comprise more than just formal R&D 19 ) are widely recognised as a 18 Peng and Kang (op sit) are arguing that collective bargaining power is a decisive factor in accounting for disparities in skill premiums; given the way labour composition is measured, weighting employment in occupational groups by the associated wage for that group, this will have an impact. 19 In concrete terms, intangible assets have been classified by some "… into economic competencies (i.e., invest in skills, advertising and branding and organizational structure), scientific and creative property (i.e., R&D and 'innovation' more generally) and Information and Communications Technology" (BIS, 2012a; emphasis in original).
key driver of enterprise performance and thus productivity (e.g., Corrado et al., 2006 Corrado et al., , 2012 Van Ark et al., 2009; Dal Borgo et al., 2013) especially by proponents of a 'resource-based' perspective of the firm (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Teece et al., 1998; Harris and Moffat, 2013b) . Their increased usage may also have played a role in increasing TFP growth. (Tables U.5 -U.9) on how industries were categorised into subgroups experiencing high-to-low levels of change. The first three decompositions are intended to measure different dimensions of globalisation.
In relation to ownership, disproportionately large contributions came from the foreign-owned sub-groups, largely due to reallocations of output shares towards relatively productive plants. Table 4 around here Industries with more highly paid labour forces made a significant contribution to aggregate productivity growth (0.6% p.a.), mostly due to the entry of relatively productive plants and exit of less productive plants. However, industries belonging to the low-level sub-group provided the largest contribution, indicating the relationship between highly skilled labour forces and TFP growth is not as clear-cut as that between openness and TFP growth. The final panel of Figure 3 shows that, as expected, industries with the highest level of intangible assets had the fastest TFP growth in 1994-2012, again because of reallocations of output share to more productive plants.
Conclusion
As is acknowledged by the UK government, the manufacturing sector makes a far larger contribution to the UK economy (to exports, innovation, other sectors through inter-industry linkages and the employment of highly skilled labour) than would be expected given its output Since the UK government is committed to increasing the role of manufacturing in the economy, it is useful to discuss the policy implications of our results. Firstly, the results support efforts to encourage activities that allow firms to build up intangible assets. R&D tax credits, which have operated in the UK since 2000, are an example of such a policy although a recent meta-analysis finds these have been less effective in manufacturing than services (Castellacci and Mee Lie, 2015) . Similarly, the results support assistance such as that offered by UK Trade and Investment to increase exporting, particularly since previous research using micro-data has found that such policies can be effective (Gorg et al., 2008; Van Biesebrock et al., 2016) .
We also find that the industries that are most involved in offshoring contribute positively to productivity growth but to a relatively small extent due to the closure of productive plants.
This suggests that these firms are moving capacity in order to lower costs, rather than to increase productivity. Whether slowing the rate of offshoring is feasible, given the UK's high wage costs, is debatable but recent reductions in the main rate of UK corporation tax (from 28% to 20% between 2008 and 2015, declining to 19% in 2017) may help at the margin. Such 21 a policy may also attract foreign-owned plants that were also shown to have contributed positively to productivity growth.
More broadly, we confirm the results of earlier papers (Disney et al., 2003; Harris and Moffat, 2013a) 
